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The purpose of this paper is to re-estimate the impact of Social Security on 
aggregate private saving behavior by using new time series data for the period 1947 
through 1993. 
The analysis is based on the life-cycle hypothesis developed by Modigliani and 
Ando. Feldstein's extended life-cycle model, incorporating Social Security Wealth (SSW) 
into the traditional life-cycle model, provides the building block for this paper. 
A Generalized Least Squares (GLS) procedure is used to perform the time series 
analysis in order to avoid autocorrelation, which is usually associated with the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) procedure. Compared with OLS estimations, the results from the 
GLS procedure do not indicate a large divergence regarding the statistical significance of 
the coefficient of SSW as well as those of other variables included except the smaller 
estimated parameter values. 
The major finding in this paper is that SSW does depress potential personal and 
private saving. The result support Feldstein's 1974 findings, but the magnitude of the 
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coefficient of SSW is smaller. Feldstein's estimations, by using OLS, indicated that SSW 
reduced potential personal saving by 50% and induced total private saving to decrease by 
38%. Our estimates imply that SSW reduces personal and private savings by 44% and 
13% , respectively. 
The most important finding in this paper is that if SSW reduces total private saving 
by 13%), in the long run the decrease in the rate of private saving would also depress the 
private capital stock by 13%, which implies a substantial reduction in GDP and a lower 
level of real income. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Social Security — officially, Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) ~ is the largest spending program of the U. S. federal government. In 
December 1993, 42,245,700 persons received Social Security benefits, 62% 
(26,104,300) were retired workers, 12% (5,077,300) were nondisabled widows 
and widowers, and 26% (10,983,782) of the beneficiaries were receiving payments 
on the basis of disability. During the 4-year short period from December 1989 to 
December 1993, total OASDI beneficiaries rose by 8% (from 39,151,400 to 
42,245,700). Benefit payments from the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, which 
pays benefits to disabled workers and their families, increased by 51%, from $22.9 
billion (in 1993 dollars) in 1989 to $34.6 billion in 1993. During the same period, benefit 
payments from the Old — Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund increased 
from $208 billion to $267.8 billion - an increase of 29%. In 1994, total Social 
Security expenditures are estimated at $320.5 billion, which is 22% of federal 
expenditures and 5% of GDP. 
Originally, the Social Security program (begun in 1935) was broadly similar to a 
private insurance system. During their working years, individuals deposited some 
portion of their salaries into a fund. Over time, the fund would accumulate interest, and 
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on retirement, the principal and accrued interest would be used to pay benefits. Such a 
scheme is called fully funded. In 1939 the system was converted to a pay-as-you-go 
basis, meaning the benefits paid to current retirees come from payments made by those 
who are presently working. Each generation of retirees is supported by payments made 
by the current generation of workers, not by drawing down an accumulated fund. An 
important reason for switching to a pay-as-you-go approach was the perception that the 
savings of many of the elderly had been wiped out by the Great Depression, and they 
deserved to be supported at a level higher than that possible with only a few years of 
contributions. This perception stemmed from a concern about social adequacy, which 
meant that the benefits paid would provide a certain standard of living for all 
contributors (Myers, R.J., 1985). Although the OASDI places considerable emphasis on 
individual equity (i.e., the contributor receives benefits directly related to the amount of 
his or her contributions) through the provision guaranteeing that total benefits payable 
with respect to a covered worker would always at least equal his/her taxes paid, the 
OASDI benefit structure has shown a trend away from individual-equity principles and 
toward more social adequacy over the years. 
As a consequence of changes introduced in 1983, the system is now building up 
substantial surpluses in the Social Security Trust Fund. These funds are being 
accumulated to support the "baby boom generation" in retirement, without having to 
raise future payroll tax rates. The 74 million people born between 1946 and 1964 make 
up roughly 30 percent of the country's current population. Currently, there are about 3.3 
workers for every retiree; when all baby boomers retire in 2030s, that number is expected 
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to fall to 1.9. Hence, when baby boomers retire, there will be a smaller proportion of the 
population working to produce the output that must be shared by workers and retirees 
alike. If their retirement were to be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, by the year 2030, 
Social Security taxes would absorb one third of the nation's payroll. To avoid such a 
dramatic rise in payroll tax rates in a short period of time, the 1983 Social Security 
reforms raised current taxes in anticipation of the baby boomer's retirement. 
Social Security tax revenues currently exceed benefit payments. In contrast, when 
the baby boom generation is retired, tax revenues will fall below benefit payments. The 
shortfall will be financed by drawing down the trust fund balance. According to the Social 
Security Board of Trustees' Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs: A 
Summary of the 1994 Annual Reports, the combined OASI and DI trust funds will run 
out of funds in 2029 — in thirty-five years. However, combined OASDI expenditures 
(Social Security cash benefits) will exceed current tax income beginning in 2013. Thus, 
current tax income plus a portion of annual interest income will be needed to meet 
expenditures for the years 2013 through 2018; moreover, current tax income, annual 
interest income, plus a proportion of the principle balance in the trust funds will be 
needed for the years 2019-2029. 
The prospects for the system have been described as the "financial crisis" of Social 
Security, which generated widespread concern and skepticism. Due to the complexity of 
the Social Security system itself, almost all of its specific provisions are potential targets 
for reform from the political and economic standpoint. Looking at the system's 
fundamental structure, two main factors are attributed to the financial problem of Social 
4 
Security. One is the annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), which occurred each July 
1 until the 1983 Social Security amendments changed to the date January 1. This 
adjustment increases benefits going to current retirees by the amount of inflation each 
year, as measured by the consumer price index. COLA is often blamed on an over-
response to the inflation which causes a potential deficit in Social Security accounts. The 
second factor is wage indexing that is considered to be the real source of the system's 
long-term troubles because of the "double indexing" problem. The initial Social Security 
benefit a worker received upon retiring was computed in two steps. First, the worker's 
gross wages before the date of retirement were added up and averaged over the number 
of months worked to determine an average monthly wage (AMW). Several brackets 
obtained by splitting AMW was then multiplied by an array of percentages called the 
"marginal benefit rates," which were set by law. The product was the worker's initial 
Social Security benefit. The 1972 Social Security amendments provided for the annual 
adjustment of the marginal benefit rates for each year's retirees by the amount of inflation 
during the years. While wages earned in distant past were, of course, not adjusted for 
recent inflation, wages earned in the years immediately preceding retirement would have 
been largely adjusted for inflation. Consequently, one part of the benefit computation, the 
AMW, was already partially adjusted for inflation by the marketplace. This double 
indexing results in sharp increases in benefits for new retirees just entering the Social 
Security system. 
Some economists have argued that the Social Security system influences people's 
behavior in a way that is detrimental to the economy's efficient operation. Most of the 
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discussion has focused on the impact Social Security has on saving behavior and labor 
supply decisions. 
The starting point for most work on Social Security and saving is the life-cycle 
theory of saving, which suggests that individual consumption and saving decisions are 
based on lifetime considerations. During their working lives, individuals save some 
portion of their incomes to accumulate wealth, from which they can finance consumption 
during retirement. These funds can be invested until they are wanted, thus permanently 
increasing society's capital stock. The introduction of a Social Security system can 
substantially alter the amount of lifetime saving. Such changes are the consequences of 
three effects. 
First, if workers view Social Security taxes as a means of "saving" for their future 
retirement benefits, they will tend to save less on their own. This phenomenon is referred 
to as the wealth substitution effect. As discussed earlier, however, with a pay-as-you-go 
system, the contributions are not all saved, or, do not go into a Trust Fund ~ part is paid 
out immediately to current beneficiaries. Thus, there is no public saving corresponding to 
the loss of private saving, which means that there will be a reduction in the total amount 
of capital accumulation. 
Second, Social Security may induce people to retire earlier than they otherwise 
would have. More and more Americans are retiring from their career jobs while still in 
good health, and comparatively few take other jobs afterward; those that do typically 
work only part-time. Among the factors that have been proposed to explain the low 
labor force participation of the elderly is the Social Security earnings test. In fact, the 
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1983 Social Security amendments were designed to offset what were believed to be 
important distortions to the labor supply. Under the earnings test, for individuals between 
ages 62 (when benefits can first be received) and 70, benefits are reduced by a certain 
amount per dollar of earnings once earnings exceed a certain limit. Benefits lost as a 
result of this test — either explicitly because individuals earn too much on a 
postretirement job or implicitly because they have not yet retired and started receiving 
benefits — are recouped later with an actuarial increase. The earning test does not apply 
after age 70. If older individuals face a continuous choice of work hours without fixed 
costs or take account of the actuarial adjustment of Social Security benefits postponed as 
a result of the earnings test, the earnings limit should not affect their labor supply before 
age 65. The earnings test does affect elders' reentry if they behave myopically responding 
to current benefits rather than Social Security wealth according to the study of Reimers 
and Honig in 1993. One of the reasons is that individuals lack the relevant knowledge of 
the Social Security rules or confidence in the stability of the Social Security system. If the 
length of retirement increases, individuals have more nonworking years during which 
consumption must be financed, but fewer working years to accumulate funds. This 
retirement effect tends to increase saving. 
Finally, suppose an important reason for saving is the bequest motive ~ people 
want to leave inheritances for their children. If people realize that the Social Security 
system tends to shift income from children (worker/taxpayer) to parents (retirees/benefit 
recipients), they will increase their saving to reduce the impact of Social Security on their 
children's incomes, thus the so-called bequest effect. 
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Given that the three effects work in different directions, on the basis of theory 
alone it cannot be known how Social Security affects aggregate saving behavior. 
Econometric analysis is necessary. 
In an influential article in the Journal of Political Economy, Martin Feldstein 
(1974) estimated that the introduction of the Social Security system had reduced personal 
saving by 50 % and depressed private saving by 38 %. His conclusions were based on a 
consumer-expenditure function estimated with U.S. time-series data and incorporating a 
Social Security Wealth (SSW) variable of his construction. 
The purpose of this paper is to re-estimate the effects of Social Security on private 
saving by using a larger sample period from 1947 to 1993. A larger sample size would 
show us stronger statistical inference regarding the impact of Social Security on 
aggregate saving behavior. In the present paper, some additional variables are also 
included in order to examine their effects on the implied impacts of SSW. Since 
autocorrelation is suspected to be associated with time series data, generalized least 
squares (GLS) estimators are employed in the paper. Compared with ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimators, the same statistical inference is derived but values of the 
coefficients of interest are smaller. The major finding of this paper is that the re-
estimation results support Feldstein's conclusions but the coefficient of SSW is smaller.. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: 
Chapter I presents introduction of this paper. Chapter II provides a brief review of 
the literature. Chapter III presents the theoretical foundation of the model for the entire 
analysis. Chapter IV presents the empirical results and the findings of this paper. Finally, 
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Chapter V provides a summary of the paper and its main conclusions. 
CHAPTER H 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The Social Security system influences the economy through its effects on private 
saving , labor supply and the distribution of income. Several economists have presented 
the theoretical and empirical evidence in support of the contention that the growth of 
Social Security and specific characteristics of the system have contributed to poor 
economic performance by reducing both labor supply and aggregate saving. Other 
economists have challenged almost every one of these arguments. In essence, the 
theoretical debate about the economic effects of Social Security centers on one of the key 
unresolved analytical issues in economics, the question of how long a planning horizon 
individuals have and how much information they incorporate into their economic 
decisions. 
The most frequently used paradigm is the "life-cycle model" developed by Franco 
Modigliani, Richard Brumberg and Albert Ando (1963), according to which people base 
their decisions about saving ,labor supply and other economically relevant behavior on 
their anticipated lifetime wealth, earnings, and the rate of returns on savings. Based on 
their preferences for leisure and consumption, in the present and at various points in the 
future, people decide how much to work, to consume, to save or dissave during their 
lifetime. 
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In a controversial study, Feldstein (1974) estimated that Social Security affects an 
individual's saving through two opposing forces. One is the "wealth substitution effect" 
which reduces saving, the other one is the "retirement effect" which increases saving. The 
net effect on an individual's saving depends upon the relative strengths of these offsetting 
forces. Feldstein (1976) refers to the theoretical basis of his analysis as the "extended life-
cycle model" that is adapted from the "life-cycle model" consumption function, where 
private voluntary intergenerational transfers are excluded. All saving during the working 
years is for the purpose of providing consumption during the period of retirement. 
Feldstein introduces two new variables. The key variable is an estimate of Social Security 
wealth (SSW). Two definitions are used: gross SSW is the present value of the retirement 
benefits anticipated by individuals; net SSW is defined as the gross SSW minus the present 
value of the Social Security taxes anticipated by current workers. The other variable used 
by Feldstein is corporate retained earnings. In essence, this is a proxy for the permanent 
component of capital gains. 
The estimated equation is as follows: 
Ct = p0 + (3,YPt + p2RE, + p3Wt + |34SSWt 
Where Ct is consumer expenditure in period t, YPt is disposable income in period t, 
REt is corporate retained earnings in period t, W, is the household net wealth at the 
beginning of period t, SSW is Social Security wealth at the beginning of period t, P0 is 
constant, and Pb P2, P3 and P4 are coefficients to be determined by the regression. The 
equation is estimated using aggregate U.S. data, deflated to constant 1958 dollars and 
divided by population. Equations are estimated for two periods: 1929-71 excluding 1941-
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46, and 1947-71. The method of estimation is ordinary least squares. Feldstein found a 
positive and statistically significant value for the coefficient of SSW (gross). This positive 
sign suggests that increases in SSW increase present consumption and, hence, decrease 
saving. Thus, the wealth substitution effect dominates the retirement and bequest effects. 
Feldstein's study spawned a considerable amount of controversy, much of which 
centered on whether his equation contains all the explanatory variables that it should. In 
particular, Feldstein's regression equation did not include the unemployment rate variable. 
Munnell (1977) has suggested that it was an important determinant of the aggregate 
amount of saving, because during years of high unemployment people were likely to draw 
down their savings to maintain their standard of living. She argued further that Feldstein's 
failure to include the unemployment rate in the equation tended to make his coefficient on 
the SSW variable appear higher than it actually was. When Munnell estimated an equation 
similar to Feldstein's, but included the unemployment rate, she found that SSW still 
reduced private saving, but the magnitude was only about 10 percent of that found by 
Feldstein. 
In another major contribution, Darby (1979) argued that using the zero bequest 
life-cycle model to explain aggregate saving and capital holdings had serious limitations. 
He extended his earlier research on the permanent-income consumption function by 
incorporating Feldstein's social security wealth variable in the specification. Although his 
results vary, depending upon the specification used and the periods covered, he concluded 
that the effect was probably smaller than that estimated by Feldstein. 
The life-cycle model presumes that people plan to consume all of their income and 
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wealth over their expected lifetime. Observed bequests are thus unplanned, arising from 
the fact that people do not know when they will die. The biggest challenge toward the life-
cycle model from the "Multigenerational Model" rests on the proposition that Social 
Security will affect private intergenerational transfers by increasing the bequests of the 
elderly and reducing the gifts they receive. It argues that many people leave bequests 
intentionally; some evidence suggests that the desire to accumulate assets for bequests 
may account for a large share of private saving in the United States ( Kotlifoff and 
Summers 1981). There are various motives for bequests. Some people may seek to extend 
their own power and influence beyond their natural lives through gifts to charities, family 
members, or others. Some people may wish to bind progeny or other relatives to 
themselves during life with the promise of a postmortem gift. Others may simply wish to 
leave pleasant memories of themselves through a final act of generosity. In short, people 
may draw satisfaction from leaving the bequest, not from the anticipated pleasure from 
consumption by the heirs. 
Barro (1978) suggested that the introduction of Social Security was likely to lead 
to offsetting changes in private intergenerational transfers so that the negative effect of 
Social Security on private saving was reduced or eliminated. His empirical evidence 
consisted of a consumer-expenditure function similar to that of Feldstein but with 
additional variables included in the specification (the government surplus, the 
unemployment rate, and the stock of durable goods). Barro found that the coefficient of 
Social Security wealth was not significantly differently from zero. In Feldstein's (1977) 
reply to Barro, he regarded the idea that there may be some induced changes in voluntary 
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transfers as a further source of ambiguity but did not accept Barro's' assumption that 
these changes fully offset the effect of Social Security. 
Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) presented new evidence that cast considerable doubts 
on Feldstein's conclusion. They argued that the SSW variable used by Feldstein was 
seriously flawed as a result of a computer-programming error. Simply correcting this error 
substantially changed the estimated effect of Social Security on saving. They also 
suggested a variety of modifications to the SSW variable to incorporate alternative 
employee perceptions and actuarial assumptions. They found evidence that Social Security 
might even have increased private saving. 
The limitations of using time-series data to study these issues have been realized by 
economists including Feldstein himself. In his reply to Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), 
Feldstein mentioned that personal saving was inherently a dynamic process that depended 
on expectations about future income and retirement benefits in ways that cannot be fully 
captured by the current income level and the actuarial present value of Social Security 
benefits. He also suggested using other types of data to examine the effect of Social 
Security. Although each type has its own problem, the biases that arise in one framework 
are not the same as those that arise in another. 
Feldstein had studied two different bodies of microeconomic household data 
(Feldstein 1976) and international cross-section data (Feldstein 1977) for two different 
samples of years. Each study used a function specification implied by the extended life-
cycle model for that type of data. The evidence in each of the studies showed that Social 
Security reduces personal and private saving. Feldstein concluded that Social Security had 
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detrimental influences on economic efficient operations. 
CHAPTER m 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
1.Traditional "Life-Cycle" Model 
The life-cycle model builds on the theory that household consumption depends not 
only on current income but also on income expected in the future. It is assumed that 
households live for only two periods, the first period is regarded as "the present" and then 
the second period would be treated as "the future." These two periods are not necessarily 
equal in length. This simplified framework is known as the "two-period" model. 
Since, in any period, the household's income is defined as the sum of output in the 
period and the interest received on the stock of bonds that were held at the end of the 
previous period 
(3.1) Y = Q + rB., 
where Y is the household's current income, Q is the current output, r is the interest rate, 
and B.! represents the stock of bonds held by households at the end of the 
previous period. 
In the two-period model, we suppose that a household inherits no assets (B0 = 0) 
and finishes life with no assets (B2 = 0), and an individual is not allowed to die in debt. 
According to the two-period model, the intertemporal budget constraint is 
(3.2) C, + C2/(l + r) = Q, + Q2/(l+r) = W, 
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where W stands for wealth. 
Equation (3.2) states that the present value of consumption must be equal to the 
present value of output. The present value of output can also be considered to be the 
household's wealth (WJ at the beginning of the first period. The present-value condition 
indicates that a household can choose any combination of consumption through time (Ct 
and C2), as long as the present value of consumption equals the present value of income. 
Households must live within their means, not period to period but over the course of their 
lifetime. 
The two-period model can be represented in graphic form, and the utility 
maximization point could be found by employing the intertemporal budget constraint and 
the household's indifference curve. In Figure 3-1, the horizontal axis represents variables 
in the first period, and the vertical axis represents variables in the second period. Point A is 
the endowment point, which reflects the particular combination of first and second period 
output of the household. If we rewrite the budget constraint as C2 = Q2 - (l+r)C] + 
(l+r)Q! it is easy to demonstrate that the budget constraint is a straight line with slope of 
-(1+r) that goes through point (C1; C2), shown as line BC in Figure 3-1. This line 
represents all the possible consumption possibilities that the household can choose in the 
two periods. Thus, the household can shift future income to the present by borrowing at 
the rate r, or it can shift present output to the future by lending at the rate r. We assume 
that the household derives utility from consumption in each period. Like any other familiar 
utility function, the intertemporal utility function UL(C!,C2) can be shown graphically by 
an indifference curve. The household maximizes its utility by finding equilibrium point A, 
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B 
x 
C2 A 
\~UL(Cj C2 ) 
c i C Per iod I 
Figure 3-1. Two-Period Model 
where the indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint, as shown in Figure 3-1. 
The life-cycle theory developed by Modigliani and Brumberg in 1953 (presented in 
Modigani and Ando 1963 study) starts from the utility function of the individual 
consumer. The aggregate consumption function for the community can be obtained by 
summing the individual consumption functions. The basic assumptions are as 
follows: 
Assumption 1: the population distribution by age and income is constant. 
Assumption 2: the utility function is homogeneous with respect to consumption at 
different points in time; or, equivalently, the individual's tastes towards present 
consumption and future consumption does not change (i.e., stable indifference curves). 
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These assumptions can be shown to imply that total consumption of a person at 
age I (or, more generally, of a household headed by such a person) will be proportional to 
the present value of total assets accruing to him/her over his/her life, or 
(3.3) ci = kipvi 
where k1 is a proportionality factor which will depend on the specific form of the utility 
function, the rate of return on assets, and the present age of the person, but not on the 
present value of total assets pv\ 
If pV = PV(E^= 1) 
where PV represents the present value of assets as a whole society. 
Then, rewriting equation (3.3), we obtain c1 = £ k* V PV, thus, 
(3.4) C = KPV 
where C is the aggregate consumption function. 
PV0 in period "0" could be divided into two parts, the present value of future labor 
income and the present value of future property income, or, 
death yL death yP 
PV = s —L. + _J_ 
° t=1 Or) ' f=l Or) ' 
where YtL is labor income, and Ytp is property income. If the market is perfectly 
competitive, the present value of future property income would equal the current value of 
the assets, ao, then 
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T death yL 
If we make the further assumption that the expected future income in year 0 is the average 
present value of future labor income, or, 
1 death yL 
Y' = 1 [ 2 
T /=1 (l+r)' 
according to equation (3.5), we have 
(3-6) PVQ = Y^ + TYe + a0 
If we further assume that expected future income in year 0 has a linear relationship 
with the current labor income, or, 
then, from equation (3.6), we have 
(3.7) PV0 = ^ + 7p i£ + aQ 
= (1
 + + flo 
Using equations (3.4) and equation (3.7), the aggregate consumption function 
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could be obtained 
(3.8) 
C = K( 1 + 7p )YLQ + KA0 
C = alj: + Ka0 
The above equation implies that aggregate consumption behavior could be described by a 
simple aggregate consumption function, linear in aggregate labor income (Y0L) and wealth 
(a j . Modigliani and Ando estimated equation (3.8) by using time series data in their 1963 
study. Note that a is the parameter that is known as the marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC), which measures the increase in consumption when income goes up by one dollar, 
and it is expected that l<a <1 (i.e., income). Modigliani and Ando estimates the value of a 
to be 0.7, and K to be 0.06. 
In the short run, since the asset agis constant, equation (3.8) becomes 
As seen in Figure 3-2, the line labeled C0 indicates that the aggregate consumption 
for a given year is a straight line with slope fS, and intercept J30, and it also implies that 
the MPC is less than the average propensity to consume (APC) . 
In the long run, according to equation (3.8) as well as Modigliani and Ando's 
finding, the aggregate consumption function is now 
(3.9) C, = Po + P ^ 
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(3.10) C = + ° ° 6 f l o 
Dividing both sides of equation (3.10) by YtL, then, 
C, / 
= 0 . 7 - ® 
aQ 
+ 0.06 — 
A A A 
Since both YtL) and (Y0L / Y,L) are constant over the long run, so 
CT = AJ£+ KA0 
(Ct / YtL) is also constant over time. So long as income keeps rising on its exponential 
trend, the growth in net worth will shift the short run consumption function in such a way 
that the observed consumption-income points will trace out the long-run consumption 
function (3.10) represented in Figure (3-2) by the line C through the origin, C0 and C1 
represent short-run consumption functions. Those points are illustrated by point 
A (Y0, C0) and point B (Y,, Q). The change of the vertical intercept in the short-run 
consumption function results from the accumulation (or decumulation) of wealth through 
saving. Suppose that a cyclical disturbance caused income to decline from Yx to Y/ . The 
consumption C : given by the short run consumption function Ct implies a higher 
consumption-income ratio and a lower saving-income ratio. But in the long run, since the 
consumption-income ratio is constant, then so is the saving-income ratio, i.e., the MPC = 
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Figure 3-2. L o n g R u n and Shor t R u n 
C o n s u m p t i o n F u n c t i o n s 
APC. The implication of this model is that saving rates rise with increases in current 
income, but not with rises in net worth. 
2. Extended Life-Cycle Model 
Feldstein extended the traditional life-cycle model by incorporating Social Security 
wealth into the consumption function in order to analyze the effects of Social Security on 
private saving. 
The distinctive contribution of the life-cycle model is its observation that income 
tends to fluctuate systematically over the course of a person's life and that personal saving 
behavior is therefore crucially determined by one's stage in his/her life cycle. When people 
are young their incomes are relatively low, and they often go into debt (dissave) because 
they know that they will earn more money later in their lives. During their working years, 
income rises to reach a peak around middle age, and they repay the debt incurred earlier 
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and save for their retirement years. When retirement arrives, income from work goes to 
zero and people consume their accumulated resources. 
The most obvious implication of this familiar life-cycle model is that Social 
Security, by providing income during retirement, reduces the required amount of saving 
during working years. More specifically, if the combination of the Social Security tax and 
the benefits that it finances has no income effect, and if the pattern of work and retirement 
is fixed, the Social Security program will reduce savings by just enough to leave 
consumption unchanged during retirement. This phenomenon is referred to as the " wealth 
substitution effect." There is, however, a second effect, (i.e., the "induced retirement 
effect") that would tend to increase personal saving. The net effect of Social Security on 
saving depends on the relative strength of the two effects. 
Simple indifference curve analysis can illustrate the dual effects of Social Security 
on private saving. If we assume that all saving is for retirement purposes, ignoring saving 
temporarily for contingencies, and bequests, then it is useful to think of the two-period 
model where individuals earn income in period 1 (working year) and retire in period 2 
(retirement year). Such a situation is presented graphically in Figure 3-3. We use the 
horizontal axis to measure the individuals' income and consumption during their working 
year. Since we assume that all income not spent on consumption will be devoted to saving, 
any point on the horizontal axis simultaneously indicates the individuals'consumption and 
saving. The vertical axis measures retirement income and consumption. 
Suppose there is a person, Tom, who intends to retired fully after age 65 in the 
absence of social security, and his earnings during the working year are represented by 
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Period II 
r e t i r e m e n t 
Figure 3-3. Dual -Effects of Social Security 
point A, at which the retirement income is zero. AB is the intertemporal budget constraint 
which shows the different consumption combinations across the time period. Point F 
describes Tom's initial position after the introduction of a social security tax. Du-ing his 
working period, Tom chooses the point El along AB to consume OC and saves CA. If the 
payroll tax is levied, Tom's disposable income will be reduced by the amount of the tax 
TA. The introduction of social security does not change this budget constraint, since he 
substitutes the tax for the saving which could assure his retirement consumption. Thus 
Tom remains at the initial utility maximization point El. The reduction in disposable 
25 
income implies that saving is reduced from CA to CT. 
Consider a different situation under which there is another person, Bob, who would 
continue to work for some time after age 65. Point H indicates an initial position with 
positive earnings in the second period and the same level of first-period earnings as point 
A. The new equilibrium point is denoted by point E2, and the corresponding saving 
is the relatively small amount GA compared with CA. Apparently, Bob is on a higher 
indifference curve compared with Tom. If the social security program induces him to retire 
completely at age 65, his initial point will shift to point F, which means his period 1 
disposable income is reduced by TA, while his period 2 disposable income is reduced to 
zero and not fully compensated by the social security benefit. The effect of introducing 
social security is, therefore, to increase saving from GA to TA. 
Since the effects of social security on private saving work in different directions, 
it cannot be predicted how social security affects saving on the basis of theory alone. 
Econometric analysis is necessaiy. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Modeling the Specification 
The empirical study, especially the construction of the SSW variable, is based on 
the earlier work by Feldstein, Barro and Munnell. According to most of the previous 
studies, the same results could be derived by using gross SSW or net SSW. Thus, in this 
paper, we use gross SSW. 
As was shown, the studies of Feldstein, Barro and Munnell present separate 
analysis for the periods 1927 through 1971 as well as the postwar period (i.e., 1947 
through 1971). In this paper we use time series data for the postwar periods from 1947 to 
1993, since the enlarged sample size will enable us to obtain stronger statistical inferences 
about the effects of SSW on private saving. The estimations presented below support the 
conclusion that Social Security depresses private saving. 
Cross Social Security Wealth (SSWGt) is defined as the present value in year t of 
the retirement benefits which could eventually be claimed by all those who are either in the 
labor force or already retired in year t. The calculation of these present values reflects 
survival probabilities and discount rate of future benefits. Net Social Security Wealth 
(SSWN) equals gross social security wealth minus the present value of the social security 
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taxes to be paid by those who are currently in the labor force. 
The SSWG is calculated by employing the age groups based on the equation 
developed by Feldstein and Munnell. For a given age group, say 20-29 years, and for a 
given year, say 1970, the SSWG for male (or female) workers could be calculated as 
follows: 
100 p /i ,^65-25 /i , 
SW = M £ -— • YD • t1 ^ • SP • i i l k L 
"(1970,20-29) (20-29) YD 1 9 ? ° ( l + £ > ) 6 5 " 2 5 ( 2 5 ' ° ( 1 + £ > ) ' " 6 4 
where 
SSW(2o-29,i970) = present discounted value of social security benefits to be received 
by insured workers in the 20-29 age group in 1970, 
N (20-29) — number of men in covered employment aged 20-29, 
BAD (1970) - average ratio of social security benefits to per capita disposable 
income for the period 1947 through 1993. There has been no trend 
in this ratio so that the average value is projected for the future, 
SP
 (25 i} = The probability that a men at age 25 survives to age I (65, 66, 
etc). Survival probability is calculated based on the Period Life 
Table, 1989 published in the Annual Statistical Supplement, Social 
Security Bulletin, 1993. In this case, suppose at age 0, the number 
of lives is 100,000, at age 25, the number survived is 97,018, at age 
65, the number survived is 73,627, then the probability of a man at 
age 25 surviving to age 65 = 73,627/97,018 = 0.7589 
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[(1+G) / (1+D)] (65"25), where G is the growth term which insures that real per 
capita income increases at 2% per year until the man retires at age 
65. D is the discount term applied to benefits from age 65 back to 
age 25, Feldstein estimated that the D was 3% 
[(1+G) / (1+D)] a"64), where G insures that income continues to grow after 
retirement which is still 2%. D serves to discount benefits after 
retirement back to age 65 at 3%. 
Before 1972, Social Security benefits were fixed by Congress in nominal terms as a 
function of a retiree's previous average nominal earnings. From time to time, Congress 
adjusted the benefits of retirees so that over the postwar period there was no trend but 
fluctuations around a benefit level equivalent to about 40% of per capita disposable 
income. In 1972, Congress voted a major change in the way benefits are calculated and 
adjusted. Starting in that year, benefits would no longer be based on an average nominal 
earnings but instead be based on the retiree's previous earnings relative to a national 
average of earnings in each previous year. In addition, an individual's benefits after 
retirement would be automatically increased each year by the percentage rise in the 
consumer index (i.e., COLA). By these two indexing changes, Congress hoped to insulate 
Social Security from fluctuations in the price level and the inflation rate. 
In the same 1972 legislation, Congress also raised Social Security benefits by 
approximately 20%. Since the indexing provisions would prevent this benefit increase 
from being eroded by future inflation, the change was intended by Congress as a 
permanent 20% rise in the level of benefits. In fact, the new method of indexing has not 
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worked as Congress intended. There was an error in the indexing formula that caused the 
benefits of new retirees to rise by much more than the increase in the general level of 
wages and prices. Between 1972 and 1993, the ratio of average benefits to the average per 
capita income varied around an average of 0.49 or 20% higher than its average of 0.41 
during the period 1947 through 1972. 
Although there is no doubt that the 1972 Social Security law caused a major 
change in the current and future level of Social Security benefits, it is not clear how this 
benefit change should be reflected in the SSW variable. Method for resolving this problem 
would be to raise all the SSW by 20% for the years beginning in 1972. This method is 
used in this paper. This 20% increase would reflect congressional intent and would ignore 
the unpredictable problems. A 20% increase of SSW would also correspond to the actual 
rise in the ratio of Social Security benefits to average income between the pre-1972 and 
the later period. 
The construction of the SSW variable is an important building block in the 
analysis. As was shown in the Ando-Modigliani/Feldstein framework, consumer 
expenditure is related to a measure of household resources over its lifetime, which implies 
that the individual's current consumption depends not only on current income but also on 
expected future income. Under this theory, the appropriate measure of an individual's 
income is "permanent" income or average lifetime income. Also, we assume that the 
individual prefers a stable consumption pattern to an unstable one over one's lifetime. 
According to the life cycle hypothesis, the following variables are components of 
average lifetime income: 1) current and lagged disposable income, 2) net retained 
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earnings, 3) net wealth of the household, and 4) social security wealth. It is worth 
mentioning the idea of incorporating the retained earnings variable in the extended 
consumption function. Retained earnings are defined as corporate saving; it will eventually 
be paid out in the form of dividends. If the firm chooses to save an additional dollar, 
overall private saving will be unchanged because households will respond by decreasing 
personal saving by the same amount. In other words, when households make their own 
saving compensate for changes in the firm's saving, it is said that they "pierce the 
corporate veil." The retained earnings variable , which was suggested by Feldstein, is 
considered as a household income variable that proxies for current and future capital 
gains. Omitting this variable will result in neglecting a significant portion of household 
income. 
2. Data 
The estimates are based on aggregate U.S. data for the time period 1947 to 1993. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all variables are in per capita 1987 dollars (Table 1), based on 
the implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditure. The implicit price 
deflators for the period 1947 through 1959 are from the National Income and Product 
Accounts, 1929-1958 and 1959-1988 Table 7.1. And the deflators for the period from 
1960 to 1993 come from the Economic Report of the President, 1994, Table B-5. 
The definitions of the dependent and independent variables are presented as 
follows: 
Dependent Variable: 
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C: Real per capita personal consumption expenditure, excluding the 
purchases of consumer durables, and including the flow of services rendered 
by the existing stock of consumer durables. Personal consumption 
expenditures 1947-1958 data were taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, 
The National Income and Product Accounts, 1929-1958, Table 1.2.; the data 
for 1959-1993 from the Economic Report of the President, 1994, Table B-6. 
Independent Variable: 
YD: Real per capita disposable personal income. The series of per capita 
disposable income for the years 1947-1958 are from U.S. Department 
of Commerce, The National Income and Product Account, 1929-1958, 
Table 2.1. From 1959- 1993, the time series are given in the Economic 
Report of the President, 1994, Table B-6. 
LAG(YD): Lagged real per capita disposable personal income. 
RE: Real per capita retained earning. The measurement of RE is undistributed 
corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption 
adjustments; the data from 1947-1958 are reported in U.S. Department of 
Commerce, The National Income and Product Account, 1929-1958, Table 
5.1, and for the years 1959 through 1993 are presented in the Economic 
Report of The President, 1994, Table B-88. 
NW: Real per capita private net worth. The data are from Economic Report of 
the President, 1994, Table B-l 13. 
UR: Unemployment rate in the total labor force, the data for 1947-1958 are 
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from the Historical Statistics of Americas, 1989, Table B2. From 1959 
through 1993 in the Economic Report of the President, 1994, Table B-36. 
S SW: The basic data required to calculate the Gross Social Security Wealth 
(SSW) variable are published in the annual statistical supplements of the 
Social Security Bulletin. SSW for 1947-1976 are given by Feldstein's 
estimates in his 1977 study, and the data from 1977 through 1993 are 
estimated by the author of this paper. 
3. Estimated Empirical Results 
The estimated equation is as follows: 
C = a 0 + a j SSW + a2YD + a3LAG(YD) + a4NW + a5RE 
A positive effect of current disposable income on consumer expenditure is 
expected. Based on the underlying life-cycle model, consumer expenditure would respond 
positively to the lagged disposable income if that variable is a positive predictor of future 
income, given the values of current disposable income and other included variables. 
Although a positive effect of RE on consumer expenditure would be expected, the 
potential difficulty with the inclu 'on of the retained earning variable is that it treats the 
corporate saving decision as exogenous with respect to the personal saving decision. To 
the extent that shifts in corporate saving are correlated with shifts in personal saving 
(that have not been picked up by the other independent variables), there would be a 
downward bias in the estimated effect of retained earning on consumption expenditure. 
A measure of household net worth is often stressed in empirical estimations of the 
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life-cycle model, which predicts a separate effect of wealth on consumption expenditure. 
Given other included variables, a positive sign on the estimated coefficient of the net 
worth variable is expected. The effect of Social Security wealth on consumer expenditure 
is, as indicated already, indeterminate. 
In order to be comparable to the specifications of Barro and Munell, the 
unemployment rate, government surplus and consumer durable variables are also included 
in different consumption function equations. 
First the model is estimated by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure in 
SPSS. Equation 1 in Table 2 is shown as follows: 
(1) C = 753.94+0.017SSW+0.349YD+0.266LAG(YD)+ 0.014NW+0.248RE 
t = (0.0022) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0245) 
F = 11019.73 n = 46 
DW= 1.218 
It seems that all the coefficients of the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant, but the value of Durbin-Watson is relatively low. For K=5, n=46, at 0.05 
significant level, dL= 1.335 and d I ; = 1.775, since DW < dL, then it means that 
autocorrelaton exists in this model. If we retest the DW statistic at the 0.01 significant 
level, it lies in the indecisive zone. Therefore, we can not conclude whether or not 
autocorrelation does exit. If it exists, the OLS estimators are still linear and unbiased but 
not efficient compared to the procedures that take autocorrelation into account. In short, 
the OLS estimators are not best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE). The consequences of 
autocorrelation can be quite serious; if a DW statistic lies in the indecisive zone, it may be 
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prudent to assume that autocorrelation exits. The visual graphic should be used in such a 
case. Figure 3-4 shows that the residuals do not exhibit a very distinctive behavior, they 
seem to be randomly distributed; but the existence of several outliers still could not 
exclude the possibility of autocorrelation. 
Since the consequences of autocorrelation can be very serious and the cost of 
further testing can be high, some remedial measures should be chosen. In this paper, we 
use the Prais-Winsten transformation to transform the model and apply OLS to the 
transformed model which will give us the usual BLUE estimators. These estimators are 
called generalized least squares (GLS). The generalized difference equations are as 
follows: 
Yt = Y t - p Y , . , 
Xt' = X t - p X t . 1 
where, Y represents the dependent variable and X represents the independent variable, p is 
estimated from DW d statistic, i.e., p = 1- d/2. 
The transformed estimated equation 2 is given in Table 2, which can be shown as 
follows: 
(2) C = 408.45+0.01 SSW+0.37YD+0.27LAGYD+ 0.013NW+0.323RE 
t = (0.0031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0011) (0.0026) 
F = 5659.42 n = 45 
Durbin-Watson Test =1.838 
A higher DW statistic indicates that autocorrelation is not likely to be present, and 
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Figure 3-5 shows randomly distributed residuals. 
Compared with equation 1, the coefficient of SSW 0.01 is slightly smaller than that 
of 0.017 in equation 2, but the parameter values in both cases are all statistically 
significant. 
In order to avoid possible autocorrelation, equation 2 is the final choice. 
We find that all the estimated partial coefficients in equation 2 have the signs that are 
expected by economic theory (except that of the estimated coefficient of SSW which is 
theoretically indeterminate). 
The estimated coefficient on SSW implies that each one dollar increase in the 
expected social security benefit leads to a 0.01 dollar increase in consumption 
expenditures and a 0.01 dollar decrease in personal saving, other things being equal. On a 
5% test level, for a two-tail test, since the P-value of the estimated coefficient of SSW is 
0.0031<0.05, then we can reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient on SSW 
is zero. It also indicates that the estimated coefficient on SSW is significantly different 
from zero, i.e., the social security program has a negative effect on private saving. 
Since the P-values of the estimated coefficients on YD, LAGYD, NW and RE are 
0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0011, and 0.026, respectively, we can conclude that each partial 
regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
The estimated R-square can be interpreted as that 99.86% of the variation in 
consumption expenditure is explained by its linear dependence on SSW, RE, YD, 
LAGYD, and NW. The adjusted R-square indicates that 99.84% of the variance in the 
consumption expenditure is explained by its linear dependence on SSW, RE, YD, 
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LAGYD, and NW. 
The overall significance of the model is examined with an F-test. 
F = [R2/(k-1)]/[(1 -R2)/(n-k)] 
= [0.9986/(6-1)]/[(1 -0.9986)/(47-6)] 
= 58500 
At the 5% test level, with 5 and 41 d.f., the critical F value is 2.45. Therefore, the 
five explanatory variables collectively have significant explanatory power on the dependent 
variable. Equations 3 through 6 in Table 2 present the different specifications, in which 
additional variables are added to the basic variables in equation 2: SSW, YD, LAG(YD), 
NW, and RE. The coefficient of unemployment rate (UR) included in equation 3 is not 
significantly different from zero, and the standard error is 763.38. Equation 3 also 
indicates that the coefficient of SSW increases slightly from 0.010 in equation 2 to 0.011 
with the same standard error 0.0033. 
Barro (1978) suggested that the unemployment variable should be the product of 
unemployment rate (UR) and disposable income (YD). Equation 4 re-estimates the 
specification by substituting UR*YD for UR. The coefficient of SSW stays unchanged at 
0.01 with a standard error of 0.003. We can conclude that UR has no effect on the implied 
impact of SSW. 
The government budget surplus (SUR) and consumer durable (DUR) variables are 
also included in Barro's specification. He concluded that the coefficient of SSW was no 
longer statistically significant if those variables were included. 
Equation 5 and 6 recalculated the estimation by adding SUR and DUR, 
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respectively. SUR still leaves the coefficient of SSW unchanged and itself is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient of DUR is not significant, but the coefficient of 
SSW decreases to 0.008 with standard error 0.004 and becomes less significant. 
The results shown in equations 3 through 6 imply that the impact of SSW on 
aggregate saving behavior can be inferred from the original specification 
(i.e., equation 2; further specifications have little effect on the coefficient of SSW). 
4. The Implication of SSW on Aggregate Saving 
Feldstein (1974) estimates that the marginal propensity to consume Social Security 
wealth is 0.021 with a standard error of 0.006 based on time series data for the period 
1929 through 1971( excluding the years 1941 through 1946) by using the OLS procedure. 
He concludes that the implied effect of Social Security is to reduce personal saving to half 
of what it otherwise would be. By halving personal saving, Social Security reduced total 
private saving by 38 percent. 
In this paper, the estimated coefficient of SSW is 0.01 with a standard error of 
0.003, which are both less than Feldstein's results. Since Social Security wealth in 1993 
was $15,198 billion (in 1993 dolla's), the implied effect of SSW is to increase 
consumption expenditures by $152 billion, implying that the potential personal saving is 
reduced by the same amount. Total personal saving in 1993 was $196 billion (in 1993 
dollars); thus, SSW will reduce personal saving by 44%. Since gross private saving 
(personal saving plus gross business saving) was $989 billion (in 1993 dollars), the implied 
effect of SSW is to depress potential gross private saving by 13%. 
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The magnitude of the effect of SSW on private saving shown in this paper is less 
than Feldstein's prediction, perhaps due to the larger sample size and a different estimation 
procedure. 
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Figure 3-4. Residual Analysis for OLS 
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Table 1. Values of Dependent and Independent Varialbes for GLS 
YEAR C SSW YD LAG(Y0) RE NW; UR URYD OUR SUR 
1947 
1948 3,078.84 5,057 65 3,711.79 • 277 74 0.02 84.45 314.23 106.25 
1949 3 060 28 4.446 71 3.534 38 3 7 ^ 79 205 35 16,526.43 0.04 156.01 344.29 (215.83) 
1950 3,167.92 5,333.75 3.921.96 3,534 38 120,61 17,142.65 0.03 117.39 416.33 248.75 
1951 3,218 43 6,787 32 3.910.33 3,921 96 150 75 17,179,47 0.01 48.01 326.75 70.97 
1952 3 287 24 6 408.12 3,954 06 3,910,33 169.74 17,593.90 0.02 67.60 326.82 (153.49) 
1953 3,350.58 6,661.14 4,087 70 3,954 06 127 42 17,995.43 0.02 70.59 380.06 21.92 
1954 3 358.92 6 231.25 4,016.23 4,087 70 166 57 17,135.82 0.04 175 35 363.32 (12.42) 
1955 3 4 9 4 76 7 746.06 4.262.18 4,016.23 266 74 18.652.50 0.02 95.88 461 43 78.13 
1956 3 559 15 7 862.54 4.370.78 4.262.18 163 05 19.410.76 0.02 104.01 377 68 99.63 
1957 3 559 28 8 389.17 4,336.01 4,370,78 167 48 20.222.03 0.03 116.94 381.29 (31.35) 
1958 3 584 12 7 851.89 4,325.42 4,336 01 118 25 19,978 82 0.05 221.41 340.40 (244.17) 
1959 3,720.91 8,431 58 4,480.68 4,325 42 242.40 20.051,30 0.03 127.31 415.80 27.89 
1960 3 709 70 8 203,60 4,426,90 4,480 58 163 68 26,069 87 0.03 148.28 385.41 97 / / 
1961 3'774.54 8.380.38 4.541 78 4.426.90 175.95 23,556.18 0.05 206.63 345 54 (87 26) 
1962 3 384.70 9,191.30 4,696.64 4.541.78 277.80 25.666.67 0.03 135.28 411 35 (32.06) 
1963 3 941 78 9 ' l 9 9 58 4.753.05 4,696.64 268 05 23,404.31 0.04 168.71 436.20 51 10 
1964 4 148 60 10 138 71 5.392.26 4.753 05 302.66 25.635.16 0.03 160 22 463.99 (40.20) 
1965 4 298 46 10,837 46 5,219.69 5.392.26 368 2 ' 26.554 66 0.02 128.76 516 40 31.99 
1966 4 463 49 11 585 87 5 495 37 5,219,59 349.76 27,395.91 0.02 112.13 530.03 (24 75) 
1967 4 522.05 11,927,94 5,664,60 5.495 37 278.95 25,801 16 0 02 131 09 511.00 (213 02) 
1968 4 723.10 12,391.59 5,835.43 5,564.60 240.22 29,030.80 0.02 123.37 590.17 15.75 
1969 4 829 87 12 699 44 5,930.99 5,835.43 186.93 30,541 18 0.02 124.10 581.67 172.05 
1970 4 8 9 7 7 6 13 10245 S 119 05 5.930 99 126 01 27,305.94 0.04 216.09 528.07 (214 07' 
1971 4 945 11 13,269.30 6,249.88 6,119.05 266.88 27,350.10 0 04 249.00 6 1 9 6 6 (185.59) 
1972 5 2 0 3 67 18,716.15 6.460 60 6.249 88 290.88 29,202.78 0.03 212.75 693 73 48 , - / 
1973 5 321 37 18 853 34 6 941 13 6,460 60 278 40 31,226 08 0.03 188.13 744,46 98 13 
1974 5 182 48 17 453 84 5,525,92 6 ,94113 55 16 28 164 25 0 04 240.42 606.88 (77 59) 
1975 5 322 86 16 341 42 6,670.69 6.525.92 297.08 25,820.92 0.06 420.95 634.76 (595 35) 
1976 5 558.16 25,126.30 6,927 75 6,670 69 266 40 29,201 87 0.04 303 19 765.45 (99 13) 
1977 5 657 50 25,333.96 7,029.93 6 ,92775 343.84 31,650.69 0.04 287.47 811.18 (5.10) 
1978 5 848 40 28 583 92 7,391.25 7.029 93 333.28 30,530.87 0.03 245.68 819.04 75.76 
1979 5 906 65 28 453 00 7 405.26 7 ,39125 218 52 32.089.13 0 03 252.88 769.44 55.97 
1980 5 842 14 2 7 5 7 4 4 0 7 297 75 7 .40526 4 1 7 9 34,136.92 0 05 352.64 651 96 (242.35) 
1981 5 8 6 8 14 28,161.39 7,462.04 7,297 75 95 64 34,889.18 0 05 359.96 698.79 (84 45) 
1982 5 389 97 2 7 2 8 7 6 6 7,393.00 7.462.04 27 13 32,779 01 0.07 497 43 681.35 (502.77) 
1983 6 13446 2 8 2 5 9 13 7 599.91 7,393.00 230 64 34.116.15 0.06 441.35 827.78 (469.65) 
1984 6 309 97 32 501 73 8 200 54 7,599 91 308 19 35.586.27 0.04 307.23 935.43 (243.05) 
1985 6 481 06 31 689 26 8 163.66 3,200 54 252.34 35,480.67 0.04 348.38 992.09 (363.44) 
1986 6 '574 97 33 203 97 8 368,12 8,163,66 77 94 38,386 55 0.04 350.19 1,063.17 (414 69) 
1987 6 734 59 33 066 65 8 246.17 8,368 12 262.42 40.145 02 0.03 285.56 1,009.03 (211.53) 
1988 6 889.15 35,386.31 8,593.90 8,246 17 301 64 40 .25135 0,03 264.33 1,099.16 (205 07) 
1989 6 887.18 35,706.65 8,574.01 8.593 90 148.98 40.619.30 0.03 270.04 1,097 14 (136.11) 
1990 6 923 03 34 901 66 8,625.04 8,574 01 182 49 43,289 83 0.03 295.64 1,076.63 (369.84) 
1991 6 780 49 33 737 33 8.451.51 3,625 04 217 15 38,430.55 0 05 384.50 994.76 (459.13) 
1992 6 9 1 2 0 6 34 676.99 8,758.69 8,451.51 216.76 43,055.70 0.05 418.69 1,126.99 (596.97) 
1993 7 0 5 6 05 34 288.82 8,769 37 8,758 69 257 24 42,485.21 0.04 342.58 1,197 28 (348.56) 
Table 2. Consumption Function Equations 
Equation SSW YD LAG(YD) N W RE UR UR*YD SUR DUR R-Square SSR DW 1 0.017 0.349 0.266 0.014 0 248 0 999 148672.06 1 218 (0.0053) (0.061) (0.059) (0.003) (0.106) 
2 0 010 0.370 0 270 0 013 0 324 0 999 101120 53 1 838 (0 0033) (0.046) (0 0419) (0.004) (0 101) 
3 0.011 0 368 0 262 0 0 1 4 0.354 1,001.630 0 999 96737 78 1.732 (0.0033) (0.045) (0.042) (0.003) (0 102) (763 383) 
4 0.010 0 362 0.264 0 015 0.358 0 152 0 999 97500 64 1.723 (0.033) (0.046) (0.042) (0 004) (0 104) (0 128) 
5 0.011 0 369 0.26 0.014 0 345 
-0.065 0 999 96330 1.798 (0 0033) (0.046) (0.042) (0 004) (0.101) (0 048) 
6 0 008 0.363 0 271 0.012 0 275 0 164 0 999 96826 65 1 889 (0.0037) (0.046) (0.042) (0.004) (0 107) (0.127) 
Note: btandard errors are shown in parentheses. SSR is the residual sum of square. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistics 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Social Security system is considered as the public provision of pensions in the 
U.S. Since it has become the biggest domestic spending program among other major 
social insurance schemes, its social and economic impacts generate widespread concern 
and controversy. 
In this paper, the major characteristics of Social Security are presented in 
Chapter I. The introduction of Social Security can substantially change the amount of 
lifetime saving due to three effects. One is the "wealth substitution effect" which will lead 
to a reduction of personal saving. And the other two effects, "induced retirement effect" 
and " bequest effect," tend to increase saving. 
Based on theoretical analysis, the impact of Social Security on private saving 
would be ambiguous because those three effects work in different directions. 
The objective in this paper is to estimate the implied impact of Social Security on 
private saving by using empirical analysis based on the life-cycle hypothesis developed by 
Modigliani, Ando and Feldstein. Time series analysis is utilized in this paper. The larger 
sample size for the period 1947 through 1993 is used to compare the statistical inferences 
with Feldstein's 1974 findings. The autocorrelation usually associated with time series 
data is corrected by employing GLS estimators rather than those of OLS. 
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The major finding in this paper is that SSW does depress personal and private 
saving. The research results support Feldstein's estimation, but the magnitude of the 
coefficient on SSW is smaller than his. Based on the estimation shown in Section IV, the 
SSW decreases personal saving and private saving by 44% and 13%, respectively. 
The most important implication of the findings in this paper is that if SSW reduces 
total private saving by 13%, in the long run the decrease in the rate of private saving 
would also depress the private capital stock by 13%. The reduction in private capital stock 
implies a substantial reduction in GDP and a lower level of real national income. 
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